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Abstract
Health care payers have an increasing interest in using financial incentives to change personal health
behaviors, with an estimated 82% of employers using financial incentives for healthy behavior in 2013.1
Several factors are fueling this increased interest: steadily increasing costs that have been resistant to
traditional forms of control, the realization that the majority of costs are driven by chronic conditions, which
are themselves in large part a result of lifestyle choices, and emerging reports that incentives have successfully
modified behaviors in a variety of contexts.2,3 In addition, the Affordable Care Act allows employers to use up
to 30% of total premiums (50% if programs include smoking) for outcomes-based rewards or penalties.4
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Reward-Based Incentives for Smoking Cessation
How a Carrot Became a Stick
Health care payers have an increasing interest in using
financial incentives tochangepersonalhealthbehaviors,
withanestimated82%ofemployersusingfinancial incen-
tives forhealthybehavior in2013.1 Several factorsare fu-
elingthis increased interest: steadily increasingcosts that
havebeenresistant totraditional formsofcontrol, there-
alization that themajority of costs are driven by chronic
conditions,which are themselves in largepart a result of
lifestylechoices,andemergingreportsthatincentiveshave
successfullymodifiedbehaviors inavarietyofcontexts.2,3
In addition, the Affordable Care Act allows employers to
useupto30%oftotalpremiums(50%ifprogramsinclude
smoking) for outcomes-based rewards or penalties.4
Cigarette smoking is ahabit that remainsoneof the
leading causes of preventable mortality5 and thereby
also has a large influence on health care costs. In a ran-
domized controlled trial involving 878 employees, fi-
nancial incentivesworth a total of $750 increased long-
termsmokingcessation rates from5.0%to 14.7%at the
end of 9 to 12 months.6 The ratio of successful long-
termcessation in this studywas similar to that achieved
among smokers given nicotine patches, sprays, bupro-
pion, andvarenicline. Sixmonthsafterdiscontinuing the
incentives, the initial quit rate ratioof2.9 (14.7%with in-
centives vs 5.0% without incentives) remained at 2.6,
providing reasonably good evidence of sustainability.
Examinationofthefinancial returnsfromimplement-
ingasimilarprogramwasdonebytheemployerwherethis
trial was performed, using available literature and factor-
inginemployeeturnover.Themodelwasreviewedbyout-
sideactuarialexperts.Thecompany’sconclusionwasthat
there was a 5-year payback period, consistent with the
firm’s time frame for other investments.
However, simply applying the reward-based incen-
tive program as designed ran into a series of unantici-
pated roadblocks. In thisViewpoint,weexplainhowthe
$750rewardeventuallybecame implementedasa$625
surcharge.
Carrots vs Sticks
There are age-old beliefs about the use of “carrots” (re-
wards) vs “sticks” (penalties). Although these ap-
proachescanbeseenaseconomicallyequivalent (eg, the
difference in the cost of health benefits for smokers and
nonsmokers canbe framed in termsof either rewards or
penalties), rewardsare seenbysomeprogramdesigners
asmoredesirablebecausetheyarenotperceivedasbeing
punitive and can offset the nonmonetary costs (such as
discomfort) to smokers of quitting. Carrots may also be
moreeffective thansticks foranemployer seeking topo-
sition itself as a desirable place towork.
Sticks, on the other hand, are beingwidely usedbe-
causeoftheperceptionthattheyareeffectiveandbecause
they do not require employers to pay anything extra for
desiredbehaviors.Astick-basedapproachpenalizes indi-
vidualswhodonotmodify theirbehaviorandhas thead-
vantageof incentivizing those individualsevenwhennot
actually applied, becausemost peoplewant to avoid the
penalty.Sticksmaybemoreefficientbecausecarrotsneed
tobefrequentlypaidwhereassticks, ifproperlydesigned,
are more rarely applied, lowering the costs of assessing
compliance with desired behaviors. This is why, for ex-
ample, theft ispenalized rather thannontheftsawarded.
Although the work by Kahneman and Tversky7 demon-
stratesthatadollar lostaffectspeoplemorestronglythan
a dollar gained (loss aversion), sticks can be problematic
if thecostsofmonitoringarehighandif this leadstoanen-
vironmentinwhichemployeesfeel liketheyarebeingcon-
stantlypenalized,suggestingthatselectiveapplicationof
a stick-based approach is likely to benecessary.
The firestormof protest at Pennsylvania StateUni-
versity that followedthedeploymentofaprogramin the
fall of 2013 that penalized employees $100 a month if
theydidnotcompleteahealth riskassessment led to the
programbeing abruptly canceled. Although therewere
a number of communication issues—and the program
planned to collect sensitive information from employ-
ees, such as plans for pregnancy and testicular self-
examination—this example illustrated that penalty-
based programs are more likely to generate resistance
than programs that simply offer rewards.
Road to Implementation
Themanagementofhealthcarecostshad longbeenafo-
cus in the company where the original study was con-
ducted and therewasgrowing interest in creating a “cul-
ture of health,” in which benefit design and worksite
programswould be used to decrease behaviors that led
to chronic disease. Several factors contributed to the
transformationfromcarrottostick.Thefinancegroupwas
very involved inoverseeinghealthcostmanagementand,
due to their general reluctance to add costs of any kind
to the company’s bottom line, theywereopposed to ab-
sorbing a sizeable up-front cost increase in the formof a
reward (estimated at several million dollars) despite the
company’s own return on investmentmodeling.
Contributing to their opposition was the firm’s de-
cision, basedon input fromemployee focusgroups, not
to enforce objective blood or saliva testing for evi-
dence of smoking cessation, which increased the pos-
sibility that employees would game the system to earn
the reward. The focus groups also uncovered strongly
held views that employeeswhoare smokers shouldnot
be rewarded for doing something that many employ-
ees had already done on their own (not smoking) and
concerns about fairness (ie, nonsmokers felt that they
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hadbeensubsidizing thehealth insurancepremiums for smokers for
years and did notwant to add to this by paying rewards). Although
the health care team made the argument that there was no guar-
antee that cessation rates would be similar when changing from a
reward to a surcharge and that employees could be informed that
rewards for smokingcessationwould reduce theexistingsubsidy for
smokers' premiums in the future, both the finance and human re-
source groups thought it most prudent to follow the focus group
feedback, although the research evidencewas based on the carrot
approach.
Once the decision was made to impose a surcharge for smok-
ers, the decision to tie this into health insurance premiums rather
thana separatepenaltywasmade forpractical reasons. Tying these
differential premiums to payroll deductionswas far simpler admin-
istratively than setting up a separate system for financially penaliz-
ing smokers. Fromamental accounting standpoint rewardsor pen-
alties thatareadministeredseparatelyare farmoreeffective—a$100
check handed to a person is much more visible than a $100 addi-
tion to that person’s paycheck automatically deposited into his or
her bank account—but premium adjustments are typically used by
employers both because of administrative simplicity and because
thispreserves the tax-freenatureof thepremiumadjustment.How-
ever, in this case it would have been difficult to separately collect
money from smokers who did not quit, highlighting that while re-
wards can be made more visible by providing them through chan-
nelsother thanthestandardpayroll system,collectingpenalties likely
would have to be done using existing administrative mechanisms.
In 2010, the firm began charging current smokers a $625 an-
nual surcharge. Employees could have the surcharge waived for 1
year if theyagreedtoparticipate inasmokingcessationprogramthat
the company offered at no cost. Smoking statuswas self-identified
at annual enrollment, as the company decided that saliva or urine
testing toverify smoking cessationwas simply too intrusive andad-
ministratively complex togowithat theoutset. Employeeswere re-
minded that identification of their smoking status, consistent with
all the information they provided at annual enrollment, was sub-
ject to the firm’s integrity policy whereby employees can lose their
jobs for not being honest with the company.
Conclusions
The road to implementation of this initiative led to a surcharge-
based approach that could differ greatly in effectiveness from the
reward-based approach that was originally tested. There is a need
for systematic testing of the relative effectiveness of rewards and
penalties in the context of health behavior.
In the context of smoking, in which all smokers would be pe-
nalized for continuing to smoke, theoretical arguments in favor of
usingstick-basedapproachesbecauseof lowerprocessingcostshold
true because there are fewer smokers than nonsmokers. Imple-
mentinga surchargeprogramaspartofpremiumadjustments is ad-
ministratively simpler than alternatives, but direct testingof the ef-
fect of bundling such rewards—or penalties—with larger sums of
money, suchaspremiums, shouldbetestedvsapproaches thatkeep
the rewards and penalties separate from paychecks and insurance
premiums.Alternativeefforts to leverage loss aversion throughvol-
untaryparticipation inprecommitmentordepositcontracts, inwhich
participants forfeit money they contribute if they don’t succeed in
achieving their goals, have been limited by participation rates typi-
cally in the rangeof 10%to25%,a limitation thatneeds tobesolved
for these tools to have a significant widespread effect on improv-
ing health.
The Affordable Care Act provisions enabling larger employer-
based outcome incentives4 suggest that hundreds of billions of
dollars could flow through such incentive programs. How such
programs are implemented will likely vary significantly in different
employer contexts based on the underlying culture and philoso-
phy about rewards vs penalties, and such decisions will likely have
a large effect on program effectiveness. In addition, researchers
should be aware that administrative challenges in delivering
rewards will limit their usage and that integrating the real-world
limitations of payroll and human resource systems into research
designs could result in findings more helpful to payers and more
likely to be used. A robust series of studies that directly compare
the effectiveness of sticks vs carrots vs carrots and sticks
together would help build an evidence base that could make
these decisions data driven and less based solely on culture and
beliefs.
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